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Abstract: Libya’s 2011 revolution enabled ordinary citizens and an emerging civil 
society to voice their demands on a variety of key issues including Libya’s new 
constitution. Libyans faced the challenge of redefining and re-empowering national 
political institutions through the establishment of a new constitution. This article 
analyses a series of constitutional grassroots debates that were led by the Forum for 
Democratic Libya thereby unpacking insights not only into the constitutional process 
itself but also into the underlying expectations regarding a new political order in the 
country. We argue that the brief period of relative peace and stability in Libya 
between 2011 and 2013 presents a “golden age” of constitutional activities that 
created meaningful interface among Libyan citizens after decades of oppression. We 
argue however that although constitutional debates allowed for citizen engagement in 
the process of constitutional development it had little bearing on the outcomes of this 
process. Citizen demands remained unanswered due to deeply entrenched informal 
political practices causing activists to face the arduous task of trying to influence a 
formal process of constitutional development. Priority demands expressed by citizens 
in our research pointed to the need for Libyan political actors to address the creation 
of a new system of governance, civil liberties and three regional priorities namely 
immigration and citizenship in Southern Libya, reconciliation and justice in Western 
Libya, and natural resources in Eastern Libya. The priorities remain unaddressed in 
Libya and provide insights of priority issues that will require serious efforts in the 
future of a stable Libya.  
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Looking back at constitutional (dis)orders in Libya 
Libya’s 2011 revolution enabled ordinary citizens as well as social and 
political actors to voice a multiplicity of demands, not least regarding freedom and 
democracy. In a post-revolution phase characterized by, among other things, 
instability, insecurity and political contestation, Libyans faced the challenge of 
redefining and re-empowering national political institutions, not least through the 
establishment of a new constitution. Looking back at these constitutional debates 
today thus provides insights not only into the constitutional process itself but also into 
the underlying expectations regarding a new political order in the country. 
During a brief period of relative peace and stability in Libya’s political 
transition, a wealth of activities concerning a new constitutional order took place in 
the country. This “golden age” of constitutional activity began with the August 2011 
Constitutional Declaration by the National Transitional Council (NTC). It would end 
in June 2014 with the contestation of the result of the elections of a new General 
National Congress (GNC).
1
 The NTC had been formed early on in the uprising of 27 
February 2011, and by early March had proclaimed itself to be the representative of 
the Libyan people.
2
 The NTC was intended as an interim transitional entity and as the 
political “face” of the Libyan revolution, at home and abroad. The NTC 
Constitutional Declaration stated that the Council would hand over power to a 
                                                 
1
 See Sawani, Youssef Mohammad and Jason Pack. “Libyan Constitutionality and 
Sovereignty Post-Gadhafi: The Islamist, Regionalist and Amazigh Challenges.” The 
Journal of North African Studies 18, no. 4 (2013): 523-543; Rana Jawad, “Libyan 
Elections: Low Turnout Marks Bid to End Political Crisis,” BBC news, 
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democratically elected National Congress, which would in its turn appoint a 
constitutional body to draft a new constitution.
 
 
After an amendment to the Declaration in March 2012 stipulating that the 
constitutional drafting body would be elected rather than appointed, the elections of 
the Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA) finally took place in February 2014.
3 
  
These elections occurred at a time of widespread protests against the General National 
Congress’ refusal to hold parliamentary elections and its decision to extend its own 
mandate instead. The CDA enjoyed a short-lived support despite the low turnout at 
these elections, the boycotts by some ethnic minorities and the limited involvement of 
citizens and activists in formal constitutional dialogues.
4
 However, by the time of the 
elections of a new national congress in June 2014, it was clear that this “golden age” 
of activities about the constitution was coming to an end. The parliamentary elections 
were marked by low voter turnout, and a deteriorating security situation. By the 
summer of 2014 fighting had broken out between forces loyal to the outgoing GNC 
and those loyal to the newly elected congress. These armed clashes spread with 
increasing severity to produce another civil conflict and closed this window of 
opportunity to debate and enact a new constitution.
5
  
The following analysis thus seeks to capture insights and priorities about the 
constitution and about governance as they emerged during this period of transition. 
Such elements point to the dilemmas that the constitution and transition more broadly 
will have to address in order to produce a more stable form of government in the 
country. The constitution in its simplest term is a nation’s highest legal reference to 
organize the shape of its governing institutions, the nature of citizen-state relations, 
and the sovereignty of the political system.
6
 After the 2011 revolution, debates about 
                                                 
3
 See Toler Lorianne Updike, “Mapping the Constitutional Process.” Cambridge 
Journal of International & Comparative Law 3 no.4 (2014): 1260-1286. 
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the constitution generated new forms of political and civic mobilization.
7
 The newly 
found freedoms of civil society, media and political parties in Libya widened the 
scope of participation in the process of constitutional development. Yet, with the 
procedural and political delays of the drafting process, this increased participation 
also underscored the divisions and contested priorities present in post-Qaddafi Libya.  
In this particular context, three myths about constitutional order in the country 
shaped Libyan’s approaches to the problem of political order. The first myth was that 
of the first Libyan constitution of 1951 as setting an example for a modern (western, 
liberal) and democratic (wide consultation, regional representation) constitutional 
process. In this perspective, the new constitutional opening initiated in 2011 
represented an opportunity to set the clock back to a time when Libya was a political 
example for the region. In this narrative, it was a time when local, regional and 
international issues could be peacefully resolved; a time before the failures of the 
monarchy (authoritarian centralization) and of Qaddafi (neo-sultanism).  
The second myth was that of the clean slate. There was the perception that the 
new constitution would inaugurate a truly new political order as there was no genuine 
constitutional and institutional order in the Jamahiriya. There was therefore a 
tendency to downplay the practical importance of the informal institutional and 
normative systems that structured social and political processes under Qaddafi. 
Unsurprisingly it was then ‘rediscovered’ that religious norms (for example 
articulated in demands for the return sharia law), as well as regional, tribal and local 
power structures and preferences (articulated in the demands for federalism, Berber 
and other minorities’ rights, etc.) shaped and placed specific constraints on the 
constitutional process. 
The third and probably most potent myth was that of the new Libyan citizen. 
Participation in and formulation of a new constitutional system was meant to shape 
and entrench a form of Libyan citizenship that could not exist before. It was meant to 
fulfil the promises of the first constitution by enabling the merging of multiple 
identities and preferences that would underpin an effective model of governance. This 
narrative fed from the first myth by downplaying the multiple causes of failure of the 
constitutional order of the 1950s and overemphasising role of the constitution in 
resolving outstanding issues and dilemmas.  
                                                 
7
 For a more detailed account see See Carmen Geha, Civil Society and Political 
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In the following, we use these myths to investigate the contemporary 
reformulations of formal political order in Libya as outlined by the citizens taking part 
in constitutional dialogues organised by non-governmental organizations in 2012-
2013.  We contextualize these experiences with constitution-making to highlight the 
processes and thematic issues that Libyans found important as they sought to entrench 
new forms of political order in post-revolution Libya. 
 
The 1951 constitution: viewing Libya’s first constitution through tainted glasses  
Libya is a former colony of Italy that progressively acquired its independence 
after the end of World War II. Under Ottoman rule prior to the Italian conquest in 
1911, Libya had no parliamentary institutions. It was administered as a province 
(vilayet) by a governor (vali; Arabic, wali) appointed directly by the Ottoman Sultan. 
The views and interests of the province were presented to the Ottoman Parliament 
(Mejlisi Mebusan) through a few local representatives of the province. As in other 
parts of the Arab World, the Ottoman era was characterized by patron-client relations. 
Most of the political and economic power was located in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica 
(Western and Eastern Libya). In 1835 the government of Sultan Mahmud II took 
advantage of local disturbances to reassert its direct authority over the regions of 
Tripolitania, Fezzan and Cyrenaica and held it until the collapse of the Empire.
 8
   
It was only after World War I that self-rule was introduced. During the 1918 
peace treaty between the Ottoman Empire and Italy, the latter gained nominal control 
over Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. In June I919 the Italian Government enacted an 
Organic Law in Tripolitania whereby an Italian wali was appointed to administer the 
civil and military affairs of the territory, assisted by an elected local council. A similar 
law was enacted in Cyrenaica in October of the same year. With the advent of fascism 
in 1922 and the accompanying rise of imperialist ambitions, any Italian consideration 
for the development of a parliamentary system in Libya disappeared. Under fascism, a 
form of military dictatorship prevailed for nearly a quarter of a century. Vandewalle 
noted that ‘opposition to Italy within the provinces had differed and had remained 
focused largely around local, provincial interests’.9 During World War II, The Allies’ 
expulsion of German and Italian troops from North Africa led to the creation of a 
                                                 
8
 For a detailed historical account see Dirk Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
9
 Ibid. p.42.  
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British Military Administration in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, and of a French 
Military Administration in Fezzan.  
In the wake of independence Libya was a divided territory with no previous 
experience as a unitary state. Independence generated an opportunity to bring together 
representatives from different regions to build the foundations of a common state.  
The role of foreign states was crucial in this process. The Allies agreed in accordance 
with the terms of the Peace Treaty with Italy to refer the case of Libya to the United 
Nations for a decision. In 1948 the UN General Assembly began to consider the 
independence of Libya. On November 21, 1949 the General Assembly adopted a 
resolution stipulating that Libya should become independent as soon as possible and 
no later than 1 January 1952. Under the auspices of the United Nations, the three 
provinces formed a National Assembly, which at its first meeting on 2 December 
1950, agreed that Libya was to become a federal state and a constitutional monarchy, 
with Idriss al-Sanussi as Head of State. The federal system of governance gave 
extensive powers to the three autonomous provinces – Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and 
Fezzan.
10
  
In 1951, the National Assembly drew up Libya’s first constitution. Pargeter 
noted that ‘given the divergent interests of the different regions, and particularly those 
of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, what emerged was a complex and cumbersome 
political system, comprising a parliament, a federal government and powerful 
provincial councils, whose heads were appointed by the king’.11 In this situation, local 
governors and councils were in a position of strength vis-à-vis the central 
administration. The dilemmas of decentralization were eventually resolved in favour 
of the central administration in a drastic and autocratic manner through the 1963 
constitutional amendment abolishing the federal system and establishing a unitary 
form of government. Limited analysis has been made of the 1963 amendment, but 
scholars attribute this reform to the ambition of King Idriss to have a stronger grip 
                                                 
10
 For an analysis of the situation at the time see Ismail R. Khalidi, “Constitution of 
the United Kingdom of Libya: Background Summary,” The Middle East Journal 6, 
no. 2 (1952): 221-228. For a later assessment see Vandewalle, A History of Modern 
Libya 
11
 Alison Pargeter, Libya: The Rise and Fall of Qaddafi (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2012), 34.  
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over economic and political development.
12
 Of relevance to the argument developed 
here, however, is the process of construction, and then of representation, of the ill-
fated 1951 constitution. 
For contemporary Libyan constitutionalists this process was perceived as a 
success for several important reasons. First, as Berween suggested, the ‘founding 
fathers’ of Libya displayed a great deal of political awareness as the drafting 
committee spent at least 25 months and conducted more than 187 meetings with 
stakeholders from the three provinces.
13
 The drafting committee also requested from 
Adrian Pelt, the UN commissioner overseeing the process, the translation of a number 
of constitutions of both federal and unitary states that they studied closely. In 
addition, the committee also displayed openness by inviting legal consultants from 
Egypt, Palestine, and Great Britain. After the 2011 revolution, Kaddoura, a Libyan 
constitutional expert stressed that the significance of the 1951 constitution resided not 
in the content of the constitutional text but in the inclusive process of drafting it.
14
 
A second distinguishing feature was the role of UN commissioner Adrian Pelt, 
who remains appreciated by contemporary political activists and constitutional 
experts in Libya.
15
 Pelt spent weeks in each of the three provinces meeting with local 
leaders and stakeholders before selecting a consultative committee for drafting the 
constitution.
16
 He ended up choosing four representatives, one from each of the East, 
West and South regions and an additional person to represent minorities. At the time, 
                                                 
12
 For a perspective on those changes from the same decade see John Wright, Libya. 
London: Ernest Benn, 1969; Frank Ralph Golino, “Patterns of Libyan National 
Identity.” The Middle East Journal 23, no.3 (1970): 338-352. For a later assessment 
of the situation see Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya; Lisa Anderson, The State 
and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-1980. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press 1986.  
13
 Mohammad Berween, “The Political Forces behind the 1951 Constitution: 
Characters, Thoughts and Circumstances”, conference paper presented at The Libya-
American Forum for Freedom, Washington DC, June 2006).  
14
 Dr. Abdelkader Kaddoura, constitutional and legal expert, Tripoli, 21 January 2013. 
15
 Dr. Faraj Najem, Forum for Democratic Libya, opening statement at a training 
workshop for constitutional dialogue facilitators, Tripoli, 15 January 2013. 
16
 For a detailed account of this process by the Commissioner himself, see, Adrian 
Pelt, Libyan Independence and the United Nations: A Case of Planned Decolonization 
(New Haven: Yale University Press for the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 1970).  
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there were more than 13,000 Jews in addition to a few hundred Greeks residing in 
Libya.
17
  
The third important characteristic of the 1951 process was the Committee of 
21 members that was selected by the Pelt Commission after months of consultations 
in the three providences. Although there were demographic disparities, the 
commission agreed to appoint the same number of 7 representatives from each region 
to give equitable hearing to each of them. Only two conditions were set for these 
representatives: that they should not be members of the main political parties and that 
an opportunity would be given to non-partisan actors to participate in the General 
Assembly.
18
 The Assembly itself comprised 60 members, 20 from each province, and 
was responsible for drafting the constitution.  
For the purpose of this analysis, it is worth noting that a significant outcome of 
the 1951 constitutional process was the formal recognition of important civil liberties 
and principles of governance. First, Libya was among the first Arab countries to adopt 
the Universal Declaration of human rights. Second, the parliamentary system 
established an equal representation of citizens from the three regions. Third, it 
adopted federalism making Libya a sovereign state grounded on a power-sharing 
agreement between the central administration and provincial governments.  
Since the 1950s, observers and activists have hailed the document as hopeful 
and promising for Libyans.
19
 In 1953 Pelt wrote for the Barqa Algadida (new 
Cyrenaica) newspaper on December 25th that ‘the Libyan new constitution aimed at 
democracy and respect of human liberties’.20 While the 1951 constitution stated that 
“all Libyans are equal before the law”, it also more problematically affirmed Islam as 
the religion of the state and declared Arabic to be the official language.
21
 As it turned 
out this constitutional experiment was to be short-lived. Yet, in the contemporary 
Libyan context, a debate on the intrinsic reasons that might have caused the failure of 
                                                 
17
 Ismail R. Khalidi, Constitutional Development in Libya (Beirut: Khayat’s College 
Book Cooperative, 1956).  
18
 Berween, The Political Forces. 
19
 Khalidi, Constitutional Development in Libya 
20
 Adrian Pelt, quoted in New Barqa Newspaper   ةفيحصةديدجلا ةقرب  , 25 December 
1952.  
21
 Republic of Libya, Constitution of 1951, articles 11 and 15. 
 13 
the 1951 constitution was not deemed by post-2011 political activists to be highly 
relevant to the reconstruction of political order after the fall of the Qaddafi regime.
22
 
 
Political order and the Jamahiriya: a formal absence with an informal presence 
By the time of the 2011 uprisings, Libya was one of the richest countries in the 
world with some of the largest oil reserves and approximately $168 billion in foreign 
assets for a relatively small population of a little over six million.
23
 At the time of 
independence, however, the country's major export was scrap metal from the debris of 
the World War II military campaigns, and the government's operating budget was 
provided almost completely by foreign states. According to one analyst writing in 
1957, “Libya’s value as a case study is that it provides an example of universal 
poverty in an extreme form.”24 The discovery of oil a decade after independence 
would change fundamentally the system of governance of the country. King Idriss 
faced new challenges to regulate the oil production and the distribution of revenues. 
Although government revenues from petroleum rose from $40 million in 1962 to 
$800 million by 1968 this affluence did not immediately translate into better standards 
of living for the Libyan population.
25
 The discovery of oil meant in practice that the 
state neglected agriculture, and centralized resources management and public good 
distribution through the central administration.
26
 In the 1960s, the King faced another 
serious challenge, ideological this time, with the rise of Arab nationalism in the 
region. This challenge became more pressing over time as political parties had been 
banned and political life focused on succession within the ailing king’s inner circle.27  
On September 1
st
, 1969 the 27-year-old Captain Qaddafi led a bloodless coup 
against the king and emerged as the charismatic leader of the Revolutionary 
                                                 
22
 Interviews with participants to a workshop on the 1951 Constitution organized by 
the Forum for Democratic Libya in Tripoli on 19 January 2013 
23
 Fayruz Abdulhadi, “Libya Goes for Broke,” Foreign Policy, August 14, 2013. 
Available at  
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24
 Benjamin Higgins, “Entrepreneurship in Libya,” The Middle East Journal 11 no. 3 
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25
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27
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Command Council (RCC)., Inspired by Nasser, Qaddafi attempted to lead the cause 
of pan-Arabism, as illustrated by the “Zuwara speech” of 1973.28 In this declaration, 
Qaddafi spelled out how greater Arab unity was not possible under the existing forms 
of government. Only through the dismantling of the state’s institutions could the will 
of the people be realized, and ‘direct democracy’ was the means to achieve a Pan-
Arab state. Conveniently, this positioning justified domestically the dismantlement of 
most of the political institutions that could pose a threat to his rule. In 1969 already, 
when Qaddafi had suspended the constitution and in 1972 he had banned political 
parties. By the end of the 1970s, analysts would often describe Libya as a state 
without government or a nation without a state.
29
 
In practice, as Hajjar remarks, Qaddafi created para-public organizations 
carrying out both the administrative and legislative functions of the state.
30
 By 1973, 
more than 2,400 locally appointed popular committees had been approved by the 
Revolutionary Command Council and took up the role of the state administration at 
the provincial level. In 1975 Qaddafi had published the Green Book in which he 
stated that the country’s citizens directly managed political and economic life; a 
proposition in stark contrast with a political system where decision-making was 
restricted to Qaddafi and his advisors.
31
 At the same time according to Joffé, the 
regime also ‘introduced a more insidious phenomenon: a de-politicization of the 
population and an atomization that took place as any type of organized activity was 
forbidden’.32 After 1977 in particular, the structure of government in its traditional 
legal-bureaucratic sense was dismantled, and the ‘people's authority’, exercised 
through people's congresses and committees, was proclaimed.
33
  
In the Green Book, Qaddafi had denounced the idea of a constitution on the 
grounds that ‘the problem of freedom in the modern age is that constitutions have 
                                                 
28
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29
 See Dirk Vandewalle, Libya Since Independence: Oil and State Building (London: 
I.B. Tauris, 1998); Anderson, The State and Social Transformation.  
30
 Samir Hajjar, ‘The Jamahiriya Experiment in Libya: Qadhafi and Rousseau’, The 
Journal of Modern African Studies 18 no. 2 (1980): 181-200.  
31
 Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya.  
32
 George Joffe, “Qadhafi’s Islam in Local Historical Perspective.” In Qadhafi’s 
Libya, 1969 to 1994 edited by Dirk Vandewalle, 150-152 (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1995). 
33
 Hajjar, The Jamahiriya Experiment.  
 15 
become the law of societies’, but law should be based on human freedom.34 The 
Green Book came to replace a formal constitution and served to legitimize the Libyan 
leader’s policies. In it, Qaddafi had argued that ‘a society has fundamental laws 
derived from either tradition or religion. This is what constitutes the moral code for a 
society that would direct the people in their practice of self-government so that the 
need for a man-made civil religion, for instance, is avoided’.35 Nowhere in the Green 
Book is there a reference to agents performing a role similar to that of a lawmaker. 
Instead it is claimed that anyone who has ‘the boldness to proclaim the will of the 
society’ opens ‘the way to dictatorship’.36 The typical functions of a formal 
constitution that would normally delineate power and authority and organize relations 
between citizens and the state, as well as between different branches of government, 
were thus mainly irrelevant in Qaddafi’s Jamahiriya.  
It would take Libyans 41 years, but in 2011 they would eventually burn and 
ridicule the Green Book in the street protests against Qaddafi that started in Benghazi 
in February 2011. The protestors said it had allowed Qaddafi to act with impunity and 
had disregarded the responsibilities of the state and the rights of the citizens.
37
 It was 
telling that at the start of the revolution, citizens directed their hatred not only towards 
pictures of Qaddafi himself but towards his book. From early on in the uprisings, 
Libyans took to the streets to call for reforms, including the introduction of a 
constitution.
38
  
As with 1951 constitution, in the aftermath of the Libyan revolution, important 
questions were not asked about the dismantling of the Jamahiriya. While the lack of a 
formal constitution certainly gave freedom to interpret the Green Book any way the 
regime wanted, this did not make Libya that different from other regimes in the region 
where the presence of formal constitutions was hardly a hindrance for autocratic rule. 
In addition, the neo-sultanistic system of governance underpinned by the Green Book 
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did also reflect a power balance between different groups, and national preferences. 
For all the empty rhetoric contained in the ideological guidelines that were meant to 
replace a formal constitution, the ever-evolving authoritarian system put in place by 
Qaddafi over the years took into account the strength of the various social groups that 
could mobilize against the regime (tribes, armed forces, religious groups, etc.). Hence 
the formal absence of a constitutional order did not amount to the absence of 
constraints on governance in the Jamahiriya. 
 
New citizens and new politics: public engagement with the constitutional process  
A new public sphere  
Citizens’ engagement with the political process gained a new prominence in 
Libya in the late 2000s with the reformist efforts of Qaddafi’s son Saif al-Islam in the 
perspective of a possible succession to his father. The facilitation of a new civil 
society and public sphere was part of a ‘liberalizing’ drive designed to promote the 
reintegration of Libya in the international and regional order.
39
 The new Libyan 
strategy to engage with the international community prompted the regime to allow for 
some freedom of assembly and association. It is precisely this emergent civil society 
that contributed to the success of the mobilization that would kick-start the Libyan 
revolution in February 2011. On 28 June 1996 following a prison riot, 1,270 inmates 
had been killed in the Abu Slim prison. The truth about the massacre would only be 
acknowledged by the regime much later in 2009.
40
 Emboldened by Saif al-Islam’s 
reformist project, the victims’ families demanded that the regime gave them 
information about how their loved ones had died.
41
 Symbolically, the mothers of the 
deceased prisoners started organized sit-ins in front of Benghazi central courthouse on 
weekly basis.
42
 The arrest of Fethi Terbil, the layer representing the Abu Slim 
families, on 15 February 2011 would set in motion a series of events that marked the 
beginning of the Libyan uprising.  
Under the Jamahiriya, there were only about 30 registered NGOs which were 
service-driven and government funded. In post-revolutionary Libya, civil society 
organizations (CSO) activities suddenly heavily outnumber governmental initiatives. 
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In 2013, there were at least 2,700 formally registered CSOs working on a variety of 
issues, with a wide range of sizes, degree of specialization, and levels of 
membership.
43
 The NGOs working in Tripoli and Benghazi can be categorized 
broadly between service-delivery and advocacy organizations. Hundreds of groups 
registered to monitor the elections of June 2012. Many CSOs were also working on 
the constitutional process, such as H2O, a youth-led organization which mobilized 
thousands of citizens on issues of voter registration and participated in dialogues on 
the constitution.
44
  
Most of this new advocacy-driven work centred on dialogue, awareness, 
participation, and broadly related to the ‘educational’ aspects of democracy. Outside 
of any governmental initiative, hundreds of dialogues were thus organised throughout 
the country to encourage citizens to participate in the constitutional process. The 
period 2012-2013 constituted in Libya a new but short-lived ‘golden age’ of 
constitutional awareness raising, somewhat similar to what had happened before the 
writing up of the 1951 constitution, but with a wider engagement of different sections 
of civil society and less direction given by state actors.
45
 
The National Transitional Council (NTC) Constitutional Declaration of 3 
August 2011 had set a timetable for the transition that included the appointment of an 
interim government, the promulgation of an election law, the establishment of a 
Higher National Election Commission (HNEC), preparations for national Constituent 
Assembly elections and the appointment of a Committee of 60 to draft the 
constitution.
46
 The elections to the national assembly that took place on 7 July 2012 
were considered by many as a milestone for Libya’s democratic transition. However 
violent incidents in the East during the elections changed the original timetable and 
led the chairman of the NTC Mustafa Abdul Jalil to announce that the constitutional 
drafting committee would be elected directly by the people in order to ease tensions 
                                                 
43
 Ibid.   
44
 Aya El Tayeb, an activist who helped launch the constitutional dialogues on a bus 
tour across Libya, indicated that H2O’s mission was to reach out and make citizens 
feel that they have a voice in this process. Interview with Aya El Tayeb, Tripoli, 
December 5, 2012.   
45
 Ibid.  
46
 Paul Salem and Amanda Kadlec, “Libya’s Troubled Transition,” Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace Paper, June 2012.  
http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/06/14/libya-s-troubled-transition/bzw4#  
 18 
with the pro-federalists.
47
 These incidents stressed the importance of a national and 
regional dialogue in the process of drafting a new constitution. 
Constitutional dialogues are generally an instrument to allow citizens to forge 
a meaning for the constitution.
48
 Ideally, this dialogue should incorporate both 
society-wide and institutional aspects. Constitutional dialogues require a minimum 
engagement of the state institutions and particularly the judiciary in fostering society-
wide constitutional discussion. The institutional progress made in 2012-2013 in Libya 
was however limited to setting up an election commission and announcing an 
electoral law for the election of the 60 members committee responsible for drafting 
the constitution. No serious effort was made by the government or the parliament to 
discuss the constitutional process with the wider public. As a result, citizens’ 
definitions of priorities and views of political order solidified mainly as a result of 
civil society activism in the constitutional process. NGOs and international 
organizations de facto took the lead in a nation-wide effort to revisit the constitution 
and by involving different categories of citizens (including women, youth, minorities, 
tribal leaders and armed rebels).  
The role of citizens and informal dialogue is commonly highlighted in the 
literature as an important prerequisite to the design of a constitution. The engagement 
of citizens can lead to a wider legitimacy of the constitution when this engagement is 
made to appear meaningful.
49
 Practitioners also note the importance of an engagement 
of stakeholders in constitutional debates particularly after conflict and regime 
change.
50
 In 2012-2013 in Libya, public opinion was highly mobilized in support of 
these dialogues. Many activists and intellectuals were wary of the case of Iraq where 
they claim that the constitution was ‘imposed’ and not locally driven.51 At the time in 
the Libyan media, there were a wealth of debates on the constitutional process and 
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what the new constitution should include.
52
 Newly empowered Libyan citizens 
wanted to have an influence on the writing of the new constitution and were trying to 
make their voices count. In addition, beyond the constitution itself, this mobilization 
around constitutional debates highlighted a range of issues that Libyans deemed 
crucial in the post-revolutionary context.  
 
Unanswered demands  
 To address some of the issues behind the debates about the constitution, we 
consider the results of a series of dialogues that took place between February and 
March of 2013 under the hospices of the Forum for Democratic Libya (FDL) with the 
support of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Selected participants 
in the dialogues and the survey were identified through a sampling of local 
stakeholders and aimed at ensuring that respondents represented the important social 
and political groups of each of the regions (including members of the military, former 
revolutionary, local councils, media, civil society, political parties, and tribal leaders). 
The dialogue topics were based on an initial mapping that took place the 
preceding year between February and May 2012, which brought together more than 
550 activists, youth, women, revolutionaries, lawyers, intellectuals, civil society and 
political groups in Benghazi, Derna, Beyda, Misurata and Tripoli among others.
53
 In 
line with what local think tanks, media and observers were reporting at the time, 
participants in these initial meetings considered to be priorities for the constitution: (i) 
the role of sharia and Islamic jurisprudence, (ii) the place of freedom and equality, 
(iii) the organization of the political and administrative system, (iv) the place of 
minorities and, (v) women’s rights.54 Participants expressed divergent views 
regarding the role of religion, particularly regarding whether the sharia ought to be the 
main or the only source of legislation. They were also divided on the question of 
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equality between men and women, particularly in relation to a religious understanding 
of equality. The issue of minorities was also a divisive issue, with some demanding 
the official recognition of the Tamazight language and others requiring that Arabic 
remained the only official language.  
On the basis of these preliminary results FDL selected three set of issues for 
focus groups to address: (1) the system of governance, (2) civil liberties, and (3) 
regional priorities. Locations for these focus groups included post-conflict towns, 
locations with recurrent tensions and violence, towns with Gadhafi loyalists.
55
 The 
following section presents the top ranking propositions chosen  in 15 dialogue 
sessions that brought together just over 900 participants in the Eastern Region 
(Benghazi, Derna, Tobruk, and Ajdabia), the Southern Region (Sebha, Murzuq, and 
Ubari), and the Western Region (Tripoli, Jadu, Bani Walid, Sirte, Misrata, Zawaya, 
Zleiten, and Khoms).
56
  
The system of governance (nitham al hokm) was widely debated as the 
inequalities in the economy and political sphere had made government a sensitive 
issue. Between 2012 and 2013 calls for a federal system emanating from, but not 
restricted to, social and political actors in the eastern region were on the rise. When 
debating the constitution, participants in the dialogues saw the relevance of a new 
governance system for the relations between citizens and state, especially in terms of 
guaranteeing political freedom and minority rights, and improving economic fairness. 
At the outset the most popular view was that constitution should give some form of 
autonomy to local councils. From the frequency of the answers provided, FDL noted 
that a majority of participants in the eastern areas supported a full-fledged federal 
system, while this was not the case in the west and south.
57
 The other most popular 
view was that the constitution should account for decentralization within a unified 
state. While the terms “federalism” or “decentralization” were politically loaded, 
citizens who participated in the discussions across the regions had similar objectives 
regarding a redistribution of goods and services. The only regional disparities were 
that these views were expressed via pro-federalist discourse in the East, while they 
were voiced as concerns about marginalization in western areas (especially in those 
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towns that were deemed not to have taken part in the revolution), and constructed as 
demands for better representation in the southern areas.  
Concerning civil liberties (al horriyat al aama) FDL again estimated via the 
frequency of answers given that the most common view was that freedom is about 
political participation and accountability rather than private liberties.
58
 The second 
most supported opinion was that freedom was about every aspect of life including 
religion, public expression and right of assembly. Libyans having lived for 42 years of 
almost complete de-politicization of public life with a regime that forbade political 
parties, independent media outlets, religious militancy and civil society activism, it 
was unsurprising that a mutually agreed perspective on civil liberties was hard to 
come by. Participants defined the issue of freedom as relevant to the constitution 
mainly because it facilitated accountability and prevented a monopoly of political 
power. They linked the protection of civil liberties to the need to enhance political 
stability. In particular they stressed that these freedoms should guarantee the right of 
expression and association, as participants often wanted to form organizations, media 
outlets, and political parties themselves. In addition, they considered civil liberties to 
be useful for the development of new economic activities, again often with a personal 
agenda in mind. Finally, although civil liberties were strongly endorsed by all 
participants, they was a clear willingness to mention their conformity to sharia law, as 
no one wanted to appear to be directly challenging this Islamic principle. 
 Finally regarding the issue of regional priorities, focus groups from different 
regions of Libya showed some significant differences regarding the prioritizations of 
the abovementioned generic themes. In the Eastern region, the main priority of 
governance was the state control of oil and natural resources. Participants identified 
this issue almost unanimously in connection to a need to reform the welfare state and 
to redistribute oil revenues more fairly. They saw the management of oil and natural 
resources as indicative of whether the political system deserved the trust of its 
citizens. Hence, they wanted the constitution to include a mechanism for direct 
investment outside of Tripoli, as well to enshrine principles of transparency that 
would avoid mismanagement. An additional concern of the participants in this region 
was how to create alternative sources of revenues outside the oil and gas sector. 
                                                 
58
 Nebbe f Dostoory Initiative, The Recommendations of Libyans. 
 22 
Importantly, natural resources were equated it with peace, stability and economic 
development in the context of a local management of these resources.
59
   
In the Southern region, the main priorities had to do with citizenship and 
immigration. Participants explained that to be a citizen involves an administrative 
procedure that recognizes one’s ability to access resources and benefits, and provides 
a shared identity regardless of people’s origin. They recognized that citizenship had 
cultural, economic and political implications especially when it came to women’s 
ability or inability to pass citizenship to their husbands and children. They wanted the 
constitution to address how Libyan citizenship could be obtained and set standards to 
solve the issue of immigration and stateless citizens, especially in the southernmost 
regions (Chad and Niger borders).
60
 The access to citizenship was directly linked by 
participants to identity and belonging. There were tens of thousands of Libya-born 
individuals in the south with no recognized citizenship and no standard procedure for 
obtaining Libyan citizenship. Participants saw these issues directly related to security 
and basic rights. In the historically marginalized southern regions, the quest of 
participants was very much about livelihood. The right to obtain citizenship for a 
number of stateless people, particularly from the Tabu ethnic group, was considered 
as a basic need to enable them to access employment, residency and health services 
from the state. 
In the Western region the main priorities centred on the issues of justice and 
reconciliation. Participants in this region stressed that the absence of justice both for 
crimes committed during and before the revolution was creating polarization and 
causing more violence. They assessed that reconciliation efforts were primarily 
needed to identify who could take part in the political process, to demilitarize armed 
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groups, and to deal with continuing violence in some areas. They wanted the 
constitution to include the mechanisms of justice that tribal leaders had successfully 
used in the past, and they saw a need to rebuild the judiciary while preserving local 
customs.
61
 The 2011 uprising was a divisive issue for residents in the Western region 
as it created deep divisions between the rebels and the Qaddafi loyalists. Participants 
all noted that reconciliation and even forgiveness of crimes committed was necessary 
for the Western region – including the “middle regions,” where the civil conflict was 
most intense – to be stable again. 
 In parallel to this FDL process, one of the authors conducted a survey asking 
participants in these dialogues how they viewed the impact of citizens’ involvement in 
this type of a political process.
62
 Only 14% of the respondents stated that they viewed 
the collective impact of civil society as ‘highly effective’ and therefore expressed 
doubts that they could have an influence over the political process. The main reason 
for their participation in the constitutional debates was to have some kind of 
‘representation’ (60%). Participants were also skeptical about the level of openness 
and responsiveness from decision-makers with only 14% of respondents believing 
that decision-makers displayed high level of openness to citizens’ views. While 
casting doubt on the responsiveness of decision-makers, they nonetheless believed 
that the average citizen had a role in shaping the constitution (77%). This role was 
said by 66% to be generally through ‘direct actions ’that included taking part in 
dialogue processes, participating in meetings, voicing opinions in the media, and 
voting in the referendum. In addition, 79% of respondents believed that their 
participating in the constitution was beneficial to them (more representation, influence 
and knowledge gained).   
The multiple political and socio-economic priorities and dilemmas present in 
post-Qaddafi’s Libya underscored the difficulty of the task of the constitutional 
drafting committee in formalizing a text that would generate and maximize consensus. 
Although the question of the system of governance in Libya appeared to be a divisive 
issue, once the terminology of federalism is taken out, the focus is on the sharing the 
national resources in order to build a national infrastructure (education, health, 
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energy, transport) and redistribute and create wealth at the local level. The recognition 
that there are shared basic needs still requires a satisfactory practical answer to the 
question of the organization and shape of a new state system. The new system would 
have to necessarily include the administrative restructuring of public institutions and 
the reorganization of the administrative prerogatives between the regions, and 
between the regions and the centre. Whichever coalition of military and political 
actors come on top of the current scramble for state power in Libya, they will have to 
face this difficult practical and ideational predicament. Today, the armed struggles 
taking place across the country only heightens the divisions highlighted in the 
dialogues, as well as the common demands that citizens would make on any new 
political system. 
 
Conclusion: continuity and change in Libyan political (dis)order 
Even in today’s fragmented Libyan polity, there are clear elements of 
continuity that shape the debate about the nature of political and constitutional order 
in these post-revolutionary and semi-democratic times. Changes in the prerogatives 
attached to Libyan citizenship remain a good illustration of the continuing relevance 
of ‘formal informal’ and ‘informal formal’ practices of exclusion and inclusion in the 
country. In the debates about the constitution, while participants demanded freedom 
and equality, the issue of political affiliation remained a defining and divisive feature 
of the post-revolutionary order. Just over two years after the date that marked the start 
of the uprising, the Libyan General National Congress (GNC) endorsed a ‘political 
isolation’ proposition of law that excluded Qaddafi loyalists, former bureaucrats and 
politicians from the new political process. On 9 April 2013, the GNC made several 
critical amendments to Libya’s interim Constitutional Declaration to prevent these 
categories of citizens from holding positions in government. On 14 May 2013, the 
GNC formally approved legislation number 13 on ‘political and administrative 
isolation’ which prohibited individuals who held public positions between September 
1969 and October 2011 from holding any public positions in the future.
63
 This law 
directly undermined Article 6 of the 2011 constitutional declaration which stated that 
‘Libyans shall be equal before the law. They shall enjoy equal civil and political 
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rights […] without discrimination due to religion, doctrine, language, wealth, race, 
kinship, political opinions, and social status, tribal or eminent or familial loyalty’.64 
This formalisation of an earlier informal exclusion of specific political actors itself 
became one of the sources of subsequent conflict in the country.
65
   
In the post-revolutionary context, constitutional dialogues could have 
constituted an interface between citizens and government, as well among the citizens 
themselves, and enabled them to consider possible solutions and scenarios for the 
country. However, the continuing ‘formal informality’ of the Libyan political system 
made it difficult to establish firm and systemic linkages between these dialogues and 
the formal process of drafting the new constitution. The mobilization of civil society 
organizations around constitutional dialogues could at times even generate more 
frustration than goodwill towards the government when it was perceived to be 
detached from formal measures of consultation. Just as well-organized consultations 
about the constitution could be important to stabilise a new political system (viz. 
Kenya, South Africa),
66
 ill-conceived processes could contribute to further internal 
dissensions. The troublesome constitutional process in Egypt, which was much 
debated in the Libyan media at the time, illustrated well how leaving significant 
segments of the population or of the political elites out could cause an important 
backlash for the state. Whilst the Libyan government and parliament received 
technical support from the international community – mainly the UN and UNDP 
whose mandate was to facilitate to the work of the constitutional drafting body – by 
the spring of 2013, even members of the UNDP delegation assessed that there was no 
link between what civil society was organising and what the GNC was planning.
67
  
One of the main reasons a formal interaction could not be established was that 
at the time Libya still had no constitutional drafting body, two years after the 
production of the interim constitutional declaration. Unlike in other transitional 
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system where the constituent assembly acts as parliament and as constitutional 
assembly, in Libya, the GNC only played a role in the constitutional process by 
determining how the constitutional drafting body was to be chosen. Hence, in a 
continuation of the earlier patterns of “formal informality,” popular mobilization on 
constitutional issues was directed at the GNC, even though the GNC was not formally 
involved in drafting the constitution.
68
 The informality of the relationships between 
citizens or non-governmental actors and politicians certainly facilitated the creation of 
communication channels with GNC representatives. However, because this 
informality applied principally to those with contacts and/or proximity with the 
Tripoli elite, it commonly ended up perpetuating the type of patronage system that 
had characterised the Jamahiriya.  
Libya’s Constitutional Declaration of August 2011 was amended in March 
2012 to determine that the constitutional drafting body would be elected directly by 
citizens with 20 members to come from each of the three regions. Inspired by the 
model of the 1951 constitution and its committee, the new committee of 60 was meant 
to draft the constitution within 60 days after convening and to submit it to the GNC 
before having it approved by referendum. By the summer of 2013, only the electoral 
law for the constitutional committee members had been adopted, and there was no set 
date for these elections. At that time, there was also no secretariat and no bureaucracy 
set up to support the drafting of the constitution; nor was there a formal consultative 
body. This lack of political and administrative groundwork made it even more 
difficult for the state elites to engage the population on the substantive issues 
pertaining to the new constitution. Indirectly, the failure of the GNC in 2012-13 to 
initiate and lead a national dialogue with citizens to underpin the formal constitutional 
process contributed to the continuing mobilization of groups and individuals in more 
localized political activities. These localized dynamics of mobilization in their turn 
also contributed to the continuing relevance of armed groups as power brokers. 
The 2012-2013 efforts at making a new constitution in Libya illustrated how 
ideational and practical continuities with earlier political practices weighted on and 
hindered the emergence of new forms of effective civic activism. The informality of 
the relationship between citizens, politicians and policy-makers that characterised the 
Jamahiriya remained present, often by default, at a time when citizens were 
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organizing themselves in new civil society organizations to have an impact on formal 
democratic institutions. The inspiration of the federal model of governance 
underpinned by the 1951 constitution remained also well present in the social and 
political imaginary, often by default as the country’s new political elites were too 
busy grappling with the organisation of political order in a unitary and democratic 
Libya to elaborate and put forward constitutional alternatives. In this context, the 
emergence of democratic form of civic activism in debates about the constitution 
faced an arduous task to be recognised as a valid contribution to this issue and as a set 
of meaningful practices for the public sphere. In all these respects, the dynamics of 
the 2012-2013 period will remain very relevant for the social and political sphere in a 
post-2014 civil conflict Libyan polity. 
 
